The Data Distribution Problem
When a file agreement is created, the user distributes file data off-chain to potential storage nodes. Wide initial distribution benefits the user—faster activation, competitive retrieval markets, lower future sponsorship costs. But after activation, the protocol faces a coordination problem: what incentivizes existing storers to share data with nodes that want to join later? Without sponsorship, existing storers could form cartels and refuse to share data, creating a permanent monopoly. Any node wanting to join would be blocked. The file would remain at minimum replication forever, concentrated among the original participants who could extract monopoly rents for retrieval services. This violates the protocol’s openness—new nodes should be able to enter freely based on economic incentives, not permission from incumbents. The sponsorship mechanism solves this by creating a market for data provision. Existing storers can offer to provide file data in exchange for time-limited commission on the entrant’s future rewards. This transforms data sharing from altruism to profit opportunity—sponsors earn revenue for helping new nodes join. The market structure ensures any existing storer can offer sponsorship, creating competition that prevents gatekeeping cartels.Trustless Bond-Escrow Mechanism
The sponsorship process must be trustless—neither party should be able to exploit the other. The protocol achieves this through a two-step on-chain commitment with bond escrow: Step 1: Sponsor posts offer. The sponsor (an existing storer) broadcasts aCreate-Sponsorship-Offer transaction to Bitcoin specifying:
- Target entrant (specific node identifier)
- Commission rate () and duration ( in blocks)
- Required bond amount ( in KOR)
- Expiration deadline ( blocks, typically ~1 day)
Join-Agreement transaction accepting the offer. This transaction atomically:
- Locks the bond () in escrow from entrant’s spendable balance
- Creates the sponsorship agreement with the offer’s terms
- Adds the entrant to the file agreement
- Removes the accepted offer from state
- Success: If the entrant submits a valid proof, the bond is returned to the entrant’s balance and the sponsorship continues normally for its full duration
- Failure: If the entrant fails the challenge, the bond is transferred to the sponsor (compensating fees and bandwidth costs), the sponsorship is voided retroactively (no commission ever paid), and the entrant is slashed and removed normally
- The sponsor cannot extort—terms are fixed on-chain before data transfer
- The entrant cannot grief—the bond at risk equals the sponsor’s costs
- Both parties have symmetric incentives to perform honestly
Market Dynamics and Equilibrium
The sponsorship market operates through competition. Multiple sponsors can post offers for the same entrant (or different entrants) with varying commission rates and durations. Entrants select the most favorable terms, and sponsors compete by offering lower rates. Equilibrium commission rate. The equilibrium rate balances the sponsor’s costs against the net present value of commission payments. The sponsor incurs:- Bitcoin transaction fees for posting the offer ()
- Bandwidth costs for transferring the file ()
Attack Resistance
The bond-escrow mechanism prevents several potential attacks: Sponsor extortion. A sponsor posts an offer, the entrant expresses interest off-chain, and the sponsor demands a higher commission before transferring data. This fails because commission rate is committed on-chain before any off-chain interaction. The entrant sees the final terms in protocol state and can accept, reject, or seek competing offers. The sponsor cannot renegotiate. Entrant griefing. A malicious actor creates a Sybil node, accepts a sponsorship offer, receives file data, then intentionally fails the first challenge to impose costs on the sponsor. Without the bond, this would cost the sponsor transaction fees and bandwidth (~200). The attack isn’t profitable but enables disproportionate cost imposition. The bond requirement ( KOR ≈ 200.60 total) while the sponsor loses nothing. The griefing attack becomes strictly unprofitable. Front-running. An adversary observes an acceptance transaction in the mempool and attempts to accept the same offer first by submitting a competing transaction with higher fees. This fails because each offer specifies a target entrant identifier. TheJoin-Agreement procedure validates signer == offer.entrant, rejecting acceptance attempts from any node other than the designated target. The targeted offer design makes front-running impossible.
Sponsor ghosting. A sponsor posts an offer but never transfers the data off-chain. The entrant waits but receives nothing. The sponsor loses Bitcoin transaction fees (wasted expenditure) and gains nothing. The entrant loses opportunity cost of waiting (bounded by ≈ 1 day). This attack is economically irrational—the sponsor incurs costs for no benefit. Entrants can mitigate by soliciting multiple parallel offers from different sponsors.